Research and theory on innovation has paid a good of attention to how innovators effectively advocate their notions within organizations. Understanding that even the best ideas don't sell themselves, successful "intraprenurers" must champion their proposals throughout every stage of the innovation process. An often unenunciated assumption in much of the work on corporate entrepreneurship is that every idea is a good idea-ones decision-makers should adopt.
In truth, that is not always so. Some ideas are, simply, bad ideas and their continued exploration and adoption have negative consequences for firms both in terms of financial expenses and distraction from other, perhaps, more worthy innovation projects.
History is replete with examples of innovations, that, in hindsight, should have been terminated far earlier than they were. New Coke comes immediately to mind (although some have suggested the introduction, as flawed as it was, actually paid off for Coca-Cola, because of the huge public reaction). Consultants and employees alike sold United Airlines on an automatic baggage-handling system in the Denver Airport. After spending over a quarter of a billion dollars on the system, United decided, in 2005, that it was a lousy idea and switched back to a traditional system. In October of 2007 the drug giant Pfizer took Exubera, an inhaled diabetes medication off the market taking an almost $3 billion loss. People inside of Pfizer had successfully advocated for an idea that turned out to be a flop. In 1972, experts persuaded the state of Florida to dump literally a million used tires into the water off the coast. Goodyear even distributed pamphlets that said, "Worn out tires may be the best things that have happened to fishing since Izaak Walton (the author of "The Complete Angler"). Bad idea. Today, Florida is embarked on a massive cleanup because the tires are ruining natural reefs and destroying fish life."
3 Similarly, environmentalists in the Netherlands swooned when they discovered that palm oil from Southeast Asia might replace petroleum as a biofuel. They successfully advocated for government subsidies for companies which produced generators that burned only palm oil. But soon they discovered their idea was counterproductive: Building demand for palm oil devastated millions of acres of rain forests, destroyed rich soil through the overuse of chemical fertilizers,
and released huge amounts of carbon emissions from draining and then burning peatlands. 4 Had each of these ideas been stopped long before they were implemented, huge savings, financial and otherwise, would have been achieved. Perhaps even more importantly, other, more profitable ideas could have been pursued instead. The inability or unwillingness to terminate projects has enormous consequence on firms. For instance, in a survey of the software industry it was found that 46% of projects were completed behind schedule, over budget (with cost overruns averaging 150%) and with fewer functions than promised, and can be characterized as runaway projects.
Of these projects only 25% are later judged as being successful. (Keil & Robey, 2001) .
In this paper, we are interested in exploring how ideas are successfully stopped early on in their development. In virtually every conceptual model of corporate innovation, bad ideas are stopped as soon as their negatives are discovered. These models assume that through welldefined criteria, decision-makers will recognize the inadequacies of poor notions and reject them through systematic analyses using methods such as stage-gates and project milestones. In every project management class, there is a hoary maxim that bad ideas should be stopped early and hard. For the longer an idea is allowed to prosper, the more difficult it is to shut down.
The reality is, though, that despite the efforts of decision-makers, bad ideas often continue to be pursued within organizations long after they should have been stopped. In the words of one senior manager in an international energy firm, too often, "Bad ideas are like tough 4 New York Times, January 31, 2007, p B1. mushrooms. You turn the lights off, and they grow; you shovel manure on them and they grow faster; you cut them off, and they resprout quickly."
Why do bad ideas continue to prosper? There are a number of explanations in the research. First, as Royer (2003) suggests, bad ideas often stick around because of "a collective belief" that develops within the firm about the ideas. Leaders become deeply committed to innovative notions blinding them from seeing their faults and encouraging them to stifle dissent by others about the ideas. Over time, emotion-driven momentum within the firm to get products to market regardless of their merits pushes poor ideas forward. Secondly, bad ideas often fester because individuals are unwilling to risk the potential negative career consequences of admitting failure (Tegar, 1980) , especially in competitive environments where others may get ahead when those individuals voluntarily pull the plug on their own ideas. Third, innovators, by their very nature, are often optimists seeing themselves as having more control over the future than they really do. Their self-confidence doesn't let them admit failure. Fourth, there is a sort of "ownership mentality" about ideas whereby people who initiate projects are less likely to see problems in those projects and more unwilling to terminate them than others. (Schmidt & Calatone, 2002) . Fifth, attributionally, people tend to assume internal causes for successes and external causes to failures. This bias encourages decision-makers to externalize bad news about projects. Sixth, is the propensity of people to escalate their commitment to ideas the longer they invest in them (Simonson & Staw, 1992) . Especially when given ambiguous information, individuals tend to integrate irrelevant prior costs (e.g, sunk costs) into their current decisionmaking thus creating greater commitment to ideas regardless of negative feedback.
Given the negative consequences of not stopping bad idea, it isn't surprising that researcher have also explored ways decision-makers can be encouraged to terminate ideas. Keil and Robey (1999) summarized existing research findings identifying 12 different factors related to the de-escalation of projects. In a follow-up study, they discovered seven of these factors were seen, by information technology managers, as effective ways of de-escalating projects. They were (1) the degree to which there was an organizational tolerance for failure, (2) the presence of publicly stated resource limits, (3) the awareness of problems facing the project, (4) the clarity of criteria for success and failure, (5) the tendency of organizations to reward decision-makers for using good decision processes rather than simply rewarding outcomes, (6) regular evaluation of projects, and (7) the separation of responsibility for approving and evaluating projects. Keil and Robey don't however, attend to the ways in which a termination decision is communicated. In project management, research on termination (e.g., Corbett, Neck, & DeTienne, 2007) suggest that many projects are ended via stage-gates systems, various metrics or established milestones for innovations, a focus on technical problems, market or opportunity assessment, discussion of alignment with organizational resources, structures, and strategy, and sometimes, just by letting notions drift into obscurity. Generally, project management models suggest that once a reasoned decision is made to terminate an idea, the idea will simply stop. Be that were it true. Royer (2003) argues poor ideas are stopped by people she labels as "exit champions." To be successful, exit champions need hard conceptual and empirical evidence when arguing to stop an idea. They must get overly zealous project champions to agree to clear criteria for making a go-stop decision. Then, through collecting and communicating hard data on those criteria, must remove any ambiguity about the weaknesses of an idea thus overcoming the convictions of project champions. The consistency among all of these studies is a focus on objective data, clear criteria, and logical decision-making processes.
Yet, despite all of these different methods, bad ideas don't always die. In many settings, corporate innovators persevere with their ideas even after failing stage-gates, receiving negative feedback, and even direct instructions to stop projects. In those cases, the challenge decisionmakers face is overcoming the resistance of idea proponent. How they do this is the focus of this paper. We offer an exploratory analysis of the realpolitiks of termination decisions that have, to our knowledge, not been explicitly captured in prior research. Our first question is how decisionmakers shut down ideas when tenacious innovators ignore the typical negative feedback mechanisms organizations offer (e.g., stage-gates) about their ideas?
In trying to terminate ideas, decision-makers face two challenges simultaneously. First, they must convince the innovator to stop his or her work on their idea. But, secondly, they must accomplish this task without destroying the commitment and motivation of the innovator to continue working on creative ideas. Telling someone that their idea-an idea they may have created and worked on for months or years-is not going to be supported runs the risk of alienating and de-motivating the proponent.
In understanding this dual challenge we conceptually draw from politeness theory.
Politeness theory suggests that people have what Brown and Levinson (1987) call two core "face" needs. Positive face is the need to be positively evaluated, to maintain a positive selfimage. Negative face is the need people have for autonomy, to not be imposed on. Brown and Levinson build explicitly on Goffman (1967) who sees face as an image located in the flow of events and as being supported by other people's judgment. In this way face becomes a public (Mao, 1994) , or for our purposes, organizational image. This interpretation of "face" fits well with Hu's (1994) description of mien-tzu, which means something like prestige or reptutation.
When decision-makers discuss failing projects with innovators they must find ways of letting an innovator maintain his or her face while, at the same time, convince him or her to terminate a project that may be of vital personal importance. How they go about this task is the second focus of this exploratory research.
The ways in which a rejection is communicated is important not only to the researcher or innovator being rejected but also to the manager or supervisor who does the rejecting. There are self-presentation issues at stake, as well as concerns for the rejected person's emotional reactions, expectation for the future of the relationship (what Axelrod (1984) called "the shadow of the future), as well as issues of blame (Folkes, 1982) .
Methodology

Sampling and Data Collection
For inductive theory-building research, theoretical sampling is appropriate, as opposed to the random sampling used in hypothesis testing and verification. As Eisenhardt (1989, p. 537) pointed out, when one is trying to build theory from case-study research, "random selection is neither necessary, nor even preferable." The organizations studied in this research effort were not selected at random but rather carefully chosen based on their "fit" with the particular aspects of organizational attributes pertinent to this study.
We sought informants who were in key positions to talk about innovation in the energy industry. At the end of the interview we asked if they knew key people in their organization or in others that they would recommend we talk to, thus generating a snowball sample (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981 ; Johnson, 1990) . When choosing informants in this manner, we are not randomly sampling from the universe of potential informants. Rather we are selectively sampling the specialized knowledge of the topic that these informants possess (Johnson, 1990) .
Each interview lasted 40-60 minutes and was audio-recorded and transcribed. To facilitate our subsequent data analysis, we translated the Norwegian interviews into English and checked everything for semantic and contextual accuracy. Then, for our analysis, we printed the Norwegian interviews with Norwegian and English translations side-by-side.
The in-depth interviews were loosely structured. By loosely structured, we mean more structured than unstructured, lest a completely unstructured interview format would "yield only a few banalities" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 17) . Because this research involved multiple sites and multiple interviewers, it was especially important to employ a similar format for the interviews, developing a common framework and maintaining cross-case comparability (Miles & Huberman, 1994) . The structure of our interview guide also permitted us to exploit any opportunities that presented themselves -a method that is flexible and that favors adaptation to each context and individual (Miles & Huberman, 1994) . Our interview guide contained a handful of topics that provided a baseline for adapting the interview to the unique opportunities that presented themselves in each interview.
In each interview, the interviewer would introduce an area of interest and provide the transition to the next topic when appropriate. "Once respondents have been brought within the sight of the topic, they must be allowed to 'go' wherever they wish" 5 (McCracken, 1988, p. 40) .
By letting informants talk themselves "warm" about a topic that engaged them, we gained many new and valuable insights. We also used probing and follow-up questions extensively. "The interviewer must be able to take full advantage of the contingency of the interview and pursue any opportunity that may present itself" (McCracken, 1988, p. 25) . We maximized the yield from my interviews by taking full advantage of this "opportunistic" approach to interviewing.
Coding of Data
Strauss and Corbin (1998) describe a stepwise approach that includes open coding (in which the categories are discovered and developed), axial coding (where the categories are arranged in a conceptual structure) and selective coding (which includes the final integration of concepts, refinement and validation of theory). Being an exploratory study with the purpose of discovering categories of communicative behavior across two countries, we focused on the front end of this stepwise process. That is, we identified unique incidents (of "items" that would stop a project) that were sufficiently dissimilar to other incidents, in order to generate a list of unique communicative behaviors. Researchers should interact with and discuss our data while coding (Charmaz, 2000) . "Coding helps us to gain a new perspective on our material, …and may lead us in unforeseen directions" (Charmaz, 2000, p. 515) . We spent time collectively coding and discussing our data.
Since our study is exploratory and our data limited in scope we focused on discovering as many unique types of behavior, not on tallying or counting the frequency of these behaviors in each category or in each country. Having generated a list of communicative behaviors we sifted through this list to weed out potential duplicates. This was our first cycle coding (Saldaña, 2009) of the data. Here we found two main dimensions: termination moves and accommodation moves with multiple subcategories for each. Our second cycle coding (Saldaña, 2009) or axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) of the data involved sifting through the interviews to collect as many examples as possible of termination moves and of accommodation moves. We then collectively went through and identified the most illustrative cases for each category. These were then organized in a large table, which were then used for subsequent resorting of incidents, and collapsing of categories. While doing this second cycle or axial coding we refined our subcategories along the two main dimensions.
As a final step we went through and looked at which things go together and are similar to each other and which do not (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Tufte, 1990) . We then identified seven super categories.
Direct.
The There seems to be a general agreement among both Norwegian and US managers that this is usually, not just a poor way to do it, the consensus is that it is the worst way to do it. There are several potential reasons for this. One is that is has negative face consequences for both parties.
The manager who consistently rebuffs petitioners with a direct "no" without giving any reason will quickly lose his or her "positive face" (Brown & Levinson, 1978 , 1987 in the organization and the stream of ideas across this managers desk will soon dry up. It also has adverse effects on the advocate's positive face as well as negative face. If a researcher has his or her ideas repeatedly rejected like this their reputation (positive face) will suffer, and this in turn will soon impact their freedom to act (negative face).
Criteria-Based
Criteria-based termination statements are ones that communicate to innovators that their ideas fail to match criteria the organization uses when judging new ideas. Sometimes, these criteria are formal-stage-gates, metrics, and so on. Criteria-based terminations represent what one typically finds in project management models. In one case, a Norwegian managers suggested that in his firm:
We have an independent evaluation we approach a larger decision, we call it an arena, who then performs a systematic QC that is an independent quality check of the product, someone who sees it from the outside.
Sometimes, though, the criteria may be more idiosyncratic-technical or financial criteria used by the decision-maker that the innovator may or may not have known were going to be applied This illustrates one of the many challenges managers and executives face in curbing their researchers and innovators enthusiasm for their projects, and it aptly illustrates the level of commitment many of them have. Terminating innovation projects is an important task and when done well it can be immensely productive.
One very effective way that emerged in the data for terminating ideas were peers reviews.
In some cases, these reviews are public and use peer pressure on the innovator to stop his or her Using peer reviews has several potentially beneficial effects. By involving innovator's peers, innovators know whom they have to get their ideas past, and might prepare better to meet and counter objections they know are coming, but it also takes the pressure off management.
Furthermore, it involves many experts with diverse backgrounds and experiences in the decision process.
Alternative Different project, same issue
Ideas are sometimes terminated by managers suggesting alternatives that might do as well as the proposed idea or by modifying the proposed idea so much that the initial idea effectively Overloading or assigning to different project seems to be a not uncommon move both in the US and in Norway. It is a political way to kill projects, since managers use their chain of command authority to steer people away from certain projects and ideas and over towards others. This can potentially be done gradually and carefully or more abrupt and explicitly.
Removing talent
In some cases, rather than reassigning the proponent, managers described times when projects were terminated by removing talent-taking vital people off a project they wanted to end. For instance:
We This only illustrates the potential importance of innovation project champions (Pinchot, 1985) .
Passing up
Finally, a political strategy that came up with some of the interviewees was passing the project responsibility on to a boss who would let the project simply die. One U.S. geophysics managers relates:
Pass it on. I'll just -if I don't have the guts as somebody's immediate supervisor, to be professional about it, the thing I would do is -I'll just pass it on to the next -We need to have a meeting with my boss to see what he thinks.
Another US manager suggests: When externalizing by spinning-out, organizations are effectively terminating any internal pursuit of the idea, while giving the proponents an opportunity to pursue the idea outside of the organization. Such a move by the organization can potentially have important positive effects on researchers and innovators, which remain in the organization, freedom to act (negative face).
Kill by independent evaluation
Another way of externalizing, is to give the responsibility for termination of a innovation project to an independent or external evaluation. 
"sometimes you talk about implementation--what a pain it would be."
A number of interviewees suggested that a common method was to highlight the challenges the innovation would face because of interdependencies between that innovation and others projects, company issues, and so on. For example, a Norwegian engineering leader related:
"It can be a project that we have where the idea is great, but in order to realize it we are dependent on very advanced camera technologies where you cannot, there is no such camera today."
Of course executives and managers might not just employ just one single kill strategy, but multiple strategies in conjunction. It is entirely possible to combine passive strategies-ignore, delay, and not helping-with criteria strategies (e.g. there is no demand), and personalizing strategies-(e.g. making fun of the idea and/or its proponent).
To illustrate the various termination moves we've created the clustering diagram in Figure 1 below. As the clustering diagram shows, there sometimes is overlap between the categories (Hodson, 1991) . This clustering map shows the relations between these concepts (Carley, 1994) . Figure 1 is an endogenous map, not an exogenous one, in that it shows the relations among the concepts themselves and not in relation to some exogenous dimension (that is, there is no X-axis or Y-axis in this figure) .
Figure 1. Clustering of termination moves
Successfully terminating an idea can help firms avoid squandering money on bad ideas as well as allowing the organization to refocus funds and talent on more profitable projects.
Escalation
Arne (11) "There are lots of internal ideas there. So to bring forth internal ideas there it is to declare that one wants ideas, that one has an open door, that one is positive when people come with ideas. Cause the worst thing you can do is to be negative if someone comes with an idea.
Then you can be certain that this person will not come back with another idea afterwards.
Arne (12) To try to motivate to new things even if you, to put it that way, fell flat on the 60 meter dash, then that doesn't mean that you should not run the 60 meter dash again.
Bakken (14) of course, have faith in it and personal ownership to it and as you say they get a stop order for it that can seem negative and demotivating.
Mark (8) When you look at the overall company, I'm not saying this is an example of a bad idea, because it may suit some places, but if you have sort of -if we accept that something is a bad idea and someone continues to push it, what it really means is -to me -that there's a manpower is being siphoned off to work on things that don't make a lot of sense of the company. And overall, if you have that type of thing going on in a big way, it really hurts your company.
You'll go out of business ultimately if you have people work
People often know it is a bad project but decision-makers won't kill it and thus those people become demotivated
We might also tie this escalation or failure to terminate a project in a timely manner to Biyalogorsky, Boulding and Staelin's (2006) finding that managers who escalated a losing course of action (commitment to a product failure) did so due to "improper use of initial positive beliefs in the face of negative new information.
Accomodation Moves
The second approach we found taken by our respondents to stop project ideas, was one we have called "accommodating moves". A central aspect to many of the accommodation moves were that the idea proponent him-/herself was the one to make the termination move rather than the proponent's manager. Characteristic of all accommodation moves was a concern towards gaining acceptance for the decision to terminate a project idea, or to maintain the idea proponent's motivation when his/her idea is terminated. A Norwegian executive stated it
clearly: "…the worst thing you can do is to be negative if someone comes with an idea. Then you can be certain that this person will not come back with another idea afterwards."
Accommodating moves are as a way to build acceptance for termination prior to making the termination move, or as a way to regain the idea proponents' motivation or to alleviate the "grief process" after the termination move was made. As another Norwegian executive stated:
"That was an idea, and clearly people were fired up about it, but there wasn't any potential in it. …so it was shut down completely. Then clearly those people go into a little grief process, that is natural."
Our analysis of the interviews yielded 17 different methods that our respondents used to as accommodating moves. The 17 methods can be organized into five clusters: (1) Organizational moves, (2) Establishing a link to decision criteria, (3) Managerial attitude, (4) People politics, and (5) 
. And then it's them coming to the conclusion that this isn't working."
The general approach here is that if the team collectively generates the idea, then emotional commitment to the idea is lower than if it is one individual's pet project, this lessens the risk for irrational escalation of commitment (Biyalogorsky, Boulding & Staelin, 2006) .
Furthermore, it enhances the ability of these teams to terminate unworthy projects themselves. Mixing the newly graduated with seasoned experts is a good way to do knowledge transfer. The newly minted get to draw on the experience of others, and those with decades of experience get exposed to new theories, approaches and ideas.
Mix staff with different levels of experience
Allow limited testing
In this category, we saw that companies would organize means to allow an idea to be tested out to a limited degree, i.e. allow some limited time and funding to be allocated to testing out an idea before making a decision whether to terminate. This might be organized formally as illustrated by a Norwegian manager:
"…. one gets put aside…20% maybe, of the budgets as "discretionary funds," so if you have a crazy idea you can come to your boss and get an OK -thank you, it doesn't fit with our strategy but sounds exciting, so you get 2 months to keep at it, make a small team and do a small pre-project on it, because…we don't have to ask anyone about it.
It might also be an informal arrangement as practiced by this US manager: "But as long as it didn't take so much of the focus and so much of the resources away, then you might let them run with it and learn from it."
By doing such testing the company would limit its commitment to one project phase at the time, and maintain right to terminate the project later:
"[O]nce we've started projects then they're defined for phase 1, which means that we agree to run it in phase 1, and then we'll reconsider what to do in phase 2. So we very rarely commit to a long run."(Norwegian executive)
The benefit of this approach is that the idea proponent might come to the conclusion him/herself to terminate the project idea: Limited testing limits not only the organization's or managers commitment and exposure to risk, but it also ensures that potentially viable ideas are explored.
Organize as formal project
A final type of move in this category was to organize even early efforts as formal projects, since by doing so, well-understood and accepted rules-of-the game were evident:
"So when we treat ideas and have come to the point where this is something we are going to take further, then we're very strict about defining it as a project. And by doing that the whole follow-up structure follows. Because we've seen that we haven't been good enough at that earlier -we've let ideas just roll on and on."(Norwegian manager)
The implication of this formal establishment of projects is that those ideas that do not get to become projects are terminated.
Establish a Clear Link to Decision Criteria
One of the most common categories terminating moves was the one that included "Criteria-based" termination. That is, projects would be terminated if they did not meet typical
Stage-Gate criteria; such as business potential, technological feasibility, alignment with company strategy and so on. It was however a common understanding across our informants that idea proponents would accept termination of their idea if it was clear to them how it did not meet such criteria. A number of moves were thus taken by the companies to run the idea selection and development process in such a way that a clear link to the business criteria was established.
Moves in this category typically involved the blending of R&D with managers, staff from business functions and customers. One Norwegian company with a separate R&D department used a rule of consistently identifying the functional line management that would eventually be the user of the idea and involve them in the decision process:
So we're very aware of that now, in that if we're going to run innovation projects or R&D projects, then the line management has to be involved. They have to commit resources and they have to be willing to pay half of the cost.
And that works as a pretty good calibration on how good that idea actually is.
A similar reasoning is illustrated by this US manager: Here the proposed benefit is that researchers get a better idea of business issues and that business managers get a better idea of technical issues, and gain a better understanding of how one hinges upon the other.
Similar moves were found to establish a link to technical criteria. As one Norwegian R&D manager said:
"In all the cases I've seen, there's been a technical discussion, which has led us to approaching it from a slightly different angle, but let them more or less keep the idea behind it. Because often the basic idea might be pretty good, but the approach to it might not be optimal."
Another way to establish a link to specific criteria, is to give specific goals to researcher.
This was employed to assess R&D staff's performance against company business goals and reward them according to how well they contributed, thus motivating them to pursue company goals rather than their own goals. The focus in these statements is twofold. One and perhaps most importantly to these managers is that they communicate to the people working with and for them, that they take them seriously and that they are open to their idea. This is important since a failure to do so might just restrict or otherwise limit the flow of new ideas that come across their descs. The second, and related issue, is that they actually take all these people and their ideas seriously, for the next one might just be the big one.
People Politics Educating
This category includes moves that serve to educate the idea proponents, and bring them to a level of understanding where they see and accept why their idea may need to be terminated.
The manager might already know that the idea is bad and should be stopped, and by involving the proponent in the exploration of the idea he would enable the proponent to see the shortcomings of the idea and accept the termination move. In the words of two US managers: We also found instances where our informants had a deliberate strategy of teaching idea proponents-by many other means than just questioning-about the need to match business criteria, and how an innovation process has to be managed. The purpose was to build understanding and acceptance among the idea proponents for why ideas often have to be 
. Clustering of accommodation moves Towards a model of innovation project termination
Here we need to connect and integrate termination and accommodation moves.
Discussion
Bad ideas are very costly for firms. They suck up time, eat up money, create unnecessary dramas, and often preclude organizations from work on other, potentially more valuable projects.
While research has clearly identified many of the ways idea champions successfully market their notions, relatively little academic study has been made about how bad ideas are successfully terminated. And, the work that has been done takes a strong cognitive and rational perspective (e.g., stage-gate models). In this project we conducted an exploratory investigation of the realpolitks of idea termination. We interviewed a number of managers both in Norway and the United States (all in energy related businesses) seeking their descriptions of the ways ideas are killed within their organizations.
The vast majority of interviewees initially offered the traditional explanations for idea termination. Certain criteria (e.g., financial) are established to evaluate ideas and when projects fail to meet those criteria, the interviewees report that idea champions are told to desist. But as we continued out discussions with these executives, many began to bring up less logical, often more personal ways, ideas are sometimes stopped in their organizations. After carefully listening to these discussions we identified seven non-criteria-based methods. The first was a simple and direct "no" with little or no explanation. The second method focused on decision-makers highlighting alternatives to champions-we already have a project underway that addresses your idea; we will keep some of your idea but we'll modify it to a point that the original idea is lost.
The third method was far more negative-personalizing the rejection by punishing, even humiliating the proponents, referencing the fact that the decision-maker gets to choose ideas, pointing out the idea will hurt, in some way, the decision-maker and thus it will be killed. The fourth cluster of methods focused on political sorts of moves. Decision-makers would reassign the proponent to another task thus making it impossible for him or her to continue their pursuit, overload the proponent with responsibilities, remove necessary talent, passing the idea on to a person who will clearly not follow-through, and wait for a change in the status of idea sponsors.
The fifth method was to externalize the idea-sell it, or spin it out, to another organization. The sixth category incorporated more passive moves such as just ignoring the idea, delaying or postponing it, and, in some cases, killing ideas by not removing the obstacles that would aid the innovator in creating their idea. The final method was to create so many hassles for the champion that the idea falters. Decision-makers do this by focusing too much on implementation early on and by hassling the innovator about all the necessary interdependencies that need to dealt with.
Let's be clear, the managers we talked with were not recommending many of these methods in most cases. Most managers found many of these methods distasteful. Nonetheless they recognized them having been done. The sample we used for this project were all engineers in the energy industry. If one were to imagine any professional group that would highlight rational and empirical methods, this would be this group. The fact that we were able to elicit some less rationale methods is impressive. We would suspect that if we had chosen a different industry-say consumer products or the media, the real-politiks methods we observed would be much stronger. Future research should explore this.
Interviewers were also very focused on how termination messages can be communicated in ways that, while stopping an individual from working on a project, don't discourage him or her from being innovative in the future. As we alluded in the introduction to this paper, decisionmakers must juggle two simultaneous challenges when shutting ideas down-killing the notion and keeping the spirits of the innovator up.
In a second part of this study we sought to understand how managers deal with the latter challenge-what we labeled accommodation moves. Here we discovered five primary methods.
In many cases, they fit nicely with the seven termination methods. Indeed, many managers would tell us how a message could be delivered both well and poorly. The first, as we discovered with the terminating moves, was the use of criteria. If the criteria is clear and well communicated, innovators will understand why their projects are being stopped. The second cluster of accommodating moves focused on how decision-makers addressed innovators when giving them the bad news. They suggested the best accommodative messages were marked by respect and openness followed by a spirit of inquiry and education. Thus, the third method of using political moves emphasized empathy when, for instance, an innovator is moved on to another project. Find, said one decision-maker, another project that will intrigue the innovator as much as the first one. Fourth, when externalizing an idea as a way of killing it, offer the innovator participation and support in the externalization. Finally, many of the interviewees suggested various organizational moves that accommodated the desires of the idea proponents while nonetheless ending the original project. For instance, let the proponent be one of the people who test the idea, make it a team activity.
In our interviews it was quite apparent that there was a universally expressed desire to take seriously all who came with ideas. Taking seriously took many forms that are expressed in these accommodation moves. Taking people seriously, even when rejecting their ideas and innovations, is an attempt to save face, both for the rejector and he rejectee. Without going into the finer details of the Chinese concept of face 6 we note that for the rejector the face element might be most closely tied to the Chinese concept of lien (Hu, 1944) . A lack of lien suggests a moral flaw or defect of character. A manager who consistently rebuffs those who approach him or her with new ideas might lose face in that employees will find this a defect in them. Whereas managers who take people seriously and listens to their ideas will find his or her lien intact even though rejecting the ideas of the persons approaching. Employees and researchers approaching with innovative ideas on the other hand stand to lose their face, or mien-tsu (Hu, 1944) , that is their reputation and prestige.
One major challenge we still face is determining how actually effectiveness of the various moves. Obviously, it would be unlikely that managers would bring them up if they were never successful. Future research will need to determine how frequently each of these techniques are used, how effective they are in actually ending projects, and the relevancy of each of these techniques to different sorts of ideas. It may well be that in engineering projects, criteria-based techniques are especially effective while in administratively-oriented projects, other techniques are more effective. There may also be major cultural differences in people's preference for the various techniques. Cultures vary on dimensions such as how direct people are in the way the approach issues. There may also be different preferences (uses) in different sorts of organizations. For example, one large energy firm is known to publicly celebrate the vital importance of consensus in reaching decisions. In that firm, ideas may be terminated in very different fashions than in firms where executives are more direct, and less democratic, about decisions. We have plans to explore these sorts of issues more quantitatively in the future through systematic surveys of decision-makers who have experience in terminating ideas.
Obviously, one concern for managers interested is how they can actually determine whether an innovative idea should be stopped. As more than one manager related, you know there are a lot of bad ideas floating around, but which ones specifically are bad is very difficult to determine. History is replete with examples of tenacious innovators who overcome massive resistance and in the, proved themselves right about their ideas. We recognize the assumption we have made in this paper that decision-makers are accurate in assessing the value of ideas prior to the termination decision.
